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, 
·;. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
--------------------------------------------------------------
INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER CREDIT 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
PIONEER TRACTOR & IMPLEMENT 
INC. , WAYNE A. SCHOENFELD ' 
and DORA C. SCHOENFELD, 
Defendants-A?pellants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16205 
Plaintiff sued the defendants upon wholesale notes and 
an open account assigned to plaintiff by International 
Harvester Company. Defendants denied any balance due alleging 
various defenses and joined International Harvester Company 
upon a third party complaint. Defendants appeal from an adverse 
judgment. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial Court denied defendant's request for a jury 
trial, allowed in the record various matters of evidence to which 
objection was made by counsel, and from said evidence made adverse 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment adverse to 
defendants. A motion to amend the findings, conclusions of law and 
judgment or in the alternative, for a new trial was denied. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek reduction of the judgment of those 
items not proved in accordance with the rules of evidence and 
the law applicable to the facts of this case, or in the alter-
native, for a new trial on all issues with a jury. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff commenced this action upon a complaint 
alleging that the plaintiff financed the purchase of parts and 
equipment upon open account and wholesale notes by the defendant 
Pioneer Tractor, alleging that credit was given for equipment 
returned, and that after applying all proper offsets, leaving a 
balance due of $27,012.43. Exhibit "B" which was alleged to be 
an itemization of said balance was merely an invoice from 
International Harvester Company upon which is handwritten the 
figures of: 
"$ 21,962.64 Balance account 
1,006.86 Jones interest charged back 
4,311.81 Balance notes 
$ 27,281.31 Total due 
268.88 Less interest back 
$ 27,012.43" (R. 155) 
Thereafter the defendants filed an ans,-.~er, and requestec 
that the plaintiff produce all documents, letters, memoranda, 
notices of sale or any other writings of any nature whatsoever, 
which plaintiff has in its possession which arose out of the 
transaction sued upon herein. (R. 131). 
-2-
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Exhibit "C" also attached to the complaint (1.. lS9) 
purports to be a demand upon the account made demand for 
"$22,700.62 charged on account" together with the alleged 
balance on notes. 
An amended complaint was thereafter filed wherein 
the plaintiff alleged in addition to the allegations of the 
original complaint "prior to the commencement of this action, 
International Harvester Company sold, transferred and assigned 
to the plaintiff, all of its right, title and interest in end to 
the notes and the account sued upon." (R. 128). An answer was 
filed which raised the defense that the complaint failed to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, admitted that 
the alleged documents were attached to the original complaint, 
denied that either the plaintiff or International Harvester 
Company held the notes sued upon, denied any balance due, raised 
the affirmative defense of unconscionability, unenforceable 
penalties, lack of notice of sale to establish deficiencies, im-
proper charees, and further, alleged the actual sale of secured 
property by plaintiff for sums in excess of the amounts credited 
to defendants. (R. 120). 
A third party complaint was filed against International 
Harvester based upon the failure of International Harvester to 
advise the defendants that International Harvester Credit Corp. 
would not include in its floor plan financing the cost of freight 
along with the invoice price upon new machines. That thereafter, 
the plaintiff refused to finance the cost of frei?,ht on said mach-
ines and committed other wrongful acts which caused the financial 
collapse of Pioneer Tractor (R. 121-122), and further that certain 
-3-
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WTDD&ful acts on behalf of the plaintiff caused termination of 
the dealership agreement. (R. 122). 
On April 14, 1978, the defendants herein tendered 
payment to the plaintiff of $6,000.00 plus the sum of approx-
imately $5,000.00 in a credit reserve account held by plaintiff. 
(R. 118). 
At a pre-trial held April 21, 1978, the plaintiff 
claimed a balance due of $27,012.43. (R. 108). On May 24,1978, 
a request for jury trial was filed by the defendants and the jury . 
fee tendered. (R. 106). A motion to strike the jury request was 
made by the plaintiff primarily on the grotmd that the action was 
based upon foreclosure. (R. 94-98). This motion was granted. (R.61 
At the trial the plaintiff, rather than relying upon the 
exhibits alleged in the amended complaint and attached to the 
original complaint relied upon Exhibit "1", a dealer sales and 
service agreement between the defendant Pioneer and International 
Harvester Company which has an addendum stapled to the back cover 
and Exhibit "2" which purports to be an agreement between Pioneer 
and the plaintiff dated February 10, 1976 which has several exhibi: 
attached thereto. 
Exhibit "1" is a sales and service agreement between 
International Harvester Company and Pioneer, and at oage 7 first 
paragraph, covers sales on credit, and in dealing with interest, 
the contract provides: 
"Such notes or contracts shall mature according 
to the terms in effect at the time of delivery and 
draw interest at the rate established by the Companv 
and specified therein." (emphasis added) 
-4-
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Stapled to Exhibit "1" is a puroorted scheclule of 
Disco\mts and terms. This schedule is not contained 1n tbe be.a, 
of the agreement which makes up Exhibit "1", which was e1pe4 by 
Wayne Schoenfeld as president of Pioneer, but is stapled to the 
back cover. It is apparent from the staple holes in the reet of 
Exhibit "1" and the lack of staple holes in the schedule, that 
the schedule, at one time or another, was not attached to EKbibit 
"1", because there is a set of staple holes which go thr01Jih f1'011l 
cover to cover of the original exhibit, but these holes do not so 
through the schedule. The schedule, on the 4th page thereof pro-
vides as follows: 
"Interest on floor plan obligations will be 
assessed monthly. Before and after maturity rates 
for the ensuing month will be determined in relation 
to the "prime rate" in effect at four of seven specified 
New York City banks on the third Monday of the current 
month." (emphasis added) 
Certain minimum and maximum rates are purportedly set by this 
oaragraph. 
Based upon Exhibit "1" and "2", Del Homestead, a witness 
for the plaintiff, testified over objections of plaintiff as to no 
foundation at pages 216 and 217 that interest upon the total claim 
was based upon the prime rate and was the sum of $5,291.09. The 
writer, searched Exhibit "1" and "2" for a provision as to interest 
upon the open account, an alleged balance of over $21,000.00 and 
to this writer's knowledge, neither of these documents provided for 
any rate of interest for charges upon the open account. 
Further, at page 213, lines 20-30, R. 214, L. 1-26, Mr. 
Homestead was asked what the balance was upon the open account and 
-5-
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objections made by defense counsel upon the basis of hearsay, 
not best evidence and no foundation were overruled and the witness: 
testified at L. 1, page 214 that the balance was $21,694.26. The 
witness then conceded that $1,914.07 of this amount was in error 
(R. 10, L. 8-12, R. 218) thus leaving a balance of $19,780.19. 
(R. 218, L. 12-14). These figures were all used by the Court in 
arriving at the balance owed in the findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law and judgment. 
During the time that these amounts were billed to Pionee: 
the defendant, Wayne Schoenfeld disputed various charges made by 
International Harvester Company on the account. (R. 219, L. 18-30, 
R. 220, L. 1-27, R. 383, L. 25-30). International Harvester often 
sent goods not ordered or sent more goods than were ordered. 
(R. 303-307, R. 386 L. 5-16, R. 383-386 L. 25-30, R. 408 L. 10-U 
R. 401 L. 19-30 ,R. 402 L. 1-30, R. 403 L. 1-23, R. 386 L. 5-16). 
The charges upon the account were not typical open 
account charges. (Court's own Memorandum Decision, R. 27 & 28). 
Exhibit "2" was described by Mr. Homestead as being a 
document that sets up the financing arrangements between plainti:: 
and Pioneer for retail financing of agricultural equipment. 
(R. 178). The dealer's reserve account, was described by this 
witness as protecting the dealer from astronomical losses. (R.l8; 
The reserve account for retail contracts on new and used equipme: 
is described in paragraph 8 of Exhibit "E" attached to Exhibit": 
and included therein is a clause which provides that such deale: 
reserve account shall be debited with "all losses" paragraph g,, 
-6-
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of Exhibit "E" attached to Exhibit "2", and that after the 
reserve account has reached $1,000.00, that losses charged to the 
Dealer's Reserve Account shall not exceed the credit balance in 
said account existing at the time of the loss. 
It was undisputed that as of December 31, 1976, the 
Dealer's Reserve Account of Pioneer had a $5,000.00 balance. 
(R. 511 and Exhibit "12"). 
Plaintiff's witness Del Homestead was allowed by the 
Court to testify orally over objection of defense counsel as to 
the following losses resulting from retail contracts, which were 
charged not to the reserve account but the dealer's open account, 
which charges were included in the balance upon the open account. 
a. On a retail installment contract with Myron 
Jones, a charge of $2,500.00 was made to Pioneers open account 
reversing an alleged credit of $2,500.00 upon the account and 
then a charge of $1,006.86 was also charges as interest upon the 
retail contract which was not in evidence. (R. 188-190). 
b. On a retail contract with Duane Taylor, an 
alleged dispute by the customer that the finance charge and pay-
ments were higher than he the customer had agreed resulted in a 
charge of $2,832.46 (R. 191-194), objection was made on the basis 
of hearsay as to the contentions of the retail customer Jones. 
(R. 191-193). 
c. On a retail contract with William Branch, the 
customer allegedly withheld $1,278.35 for an alleged mechanical 
problem with a used tractor. No contract was in evidence, nor 
·o~as anv · h th hearsay evl"dence to prove any defect testlrnonv ot er an 
or the withholding of funds. (R. 194-196). 
-7-
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d. In the matter of a retail contract of Garth 
Sweeten, the Court allowed testimony of Mr. Homestead as to the 
fact that a hitch on a drill was ordered, but was not furnished 
and without the production of any written contract or without 
testifying as to whether or not the witness had personal know-
ledge of this shortage (R. 196-197), Mr. Don Sterrett, sales 
manager of Pioneer testified that the drills in question were 
ordered from International Harvester Company with a hitch, but 
when the drills arrived, the hitch was not included. Pioneer's 
open acco\.mt was charged with $599.03. (R. 343-344). 
e. In the matter of Sam Kogianes, evidence of 
out of Court statements were allowed in to prove that despite 
a written agreement to the contrary, the customer contended 
that he was entitled to a different attachment on a combine. 
(R. 197-200). While the witness contended that Schoenfeld agreed 
to it, Schoenfeld testified that he only agreed to obtain a diff· 
erent attachment after Homestead threatened to "unwind three (3) 
contracts" which Kogianes had made, which would have resulted in 
a loss to the dealership of $5,000.00 in lost profit. (R. Sll-511 
The defendant Pioneer, on the other hand itemized their 
contentions of the erroneous charges upon the account item by 
item in Exhibit "12", which was prepared by Hr. Schoenfeld from 
statements of plaintiff received by Pioneer. (R. 158). Included 
in this list were the charges from a to c above on retail contrac 
and the $1,914.07 which plaintiff conceded prior to trial. This 
list was made available to Mr. Homestead and discussed in a me" 
in September of 1977 between Homestead, Critchfield and Schoenfe 
-3-
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Also included in Exhibit "12" is a purported charge of 
"$10,304.30 in freight which was paid to IH (J:ntemati.onal Harvester 
Company) and not refunded in full by 3% deduction claimed by IH." 
It was the contention of defendants at trial that there was no 
foundation for such a charge to the open account, that the in-
voices to support such a charge had never been produced for exam-
(R. 281-282) 
ination or in Court/and that such a charge bore no reasonable 
relationship to the expense of International Harvester Company. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANTS OWED 
THE PLAINTIFF THE SUM OF $19,780.19 
Plaintiff's witness, Homestead testified over the obj-
ections of the defendants upon the grounds of hearsay, no found-
ation and best evidence, that the books and records of the 
plaintiff showed that defendants owed to plain~iff the sum of 
$1,006.86 for interest charged upon the Myron Jones retail contract 
and $21,694.26 which was the balance upon an open account. (R. 211-
213). Then Mr. Homestead conceded that $1,914.07 of these charges 
were in error. (R.218). The balance arrived at by these figures 
was the precise figure used in the findings of fact, and judgment 
entered herein. 
The witness then proceeded to enumerate over the objection 
of defense counsel, certain charges which had been made to the 
Pioneer account based upon the alleged failure of customers to pay 
certain retail contracts. ~either the contracts or the records 
showing oayment or non-payment of these contracts were offered or 
-9-
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admitted as evidence. 
At the end of plaintiff's case, a motion to strike 
plaintiff's evidence as being without foundation, not the best 
evidence and hearsay was taken under advisement by the Court. 
While this motion was not ruled upon formally, it was apparently 
denied. No summary of the debits and credits on the open acco~t 
nor of the items represented by the alleged contracts was made 
or offered into evidence. Nor was there any evidence offered as 
to the manner of keeping the books and records of either the 
plaintiff or its alleged assignor. 
The plaintiff, in its argument to the trial Court reliei 
upon the case of State v. Olsen, 287 P 181, 75 U 583 (1930), a 
criminal case of bank embezzlement where a bank examiner testifiei 
orally to a shortage shown U?On the books of a bank after a for~: 
audit by the witness. This type of evidence was used in that 
case solely to show a shortage of dollars, upon the bank books 
not the reasonableness thereof or whether one nerson or another 
was liable for the loss. The case has been followed only in sim· 
ilar cases involving shortages of dollars in this state and has 
not been cited in this jurisdiction in civil cases where the 
issues between the parties are whether or not the charges were fo: 
goods alleged to be sold and delivered or services alleged to be 
performed and whether the charges therefor were reasonable or 
agreed upon. 
The line of cases applicable to the case at bar begins 
with Sprague v. Boyle, 4 U 2d 344, 294 P2d 689 (1956), wherein;: 
was contended by the anpellant from an adverse judgment that a 
-10-
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written summary of $3,295.28 in equipment charges and $2,289.94 
in wages was without foundation and not the best evidence. Tba 
Utah Supreme Court held that the schedule was admissable, pro-
vided that such a summary of charges must, in order to be 
admissable be shown to be developed from records, books, or docu-
ments, the competency of which has been established and which 
have been made available for examination by adverse counsel. In 
that case, the person who prepared the summary testified from 
first hand knowledge as to how the underlying books were kept and 
the person had the cancelled checks, invoices and vouchers to 
support the charges in Court. 
In the case of Nalder v. Kellog, 6 U 2d 367, 314 P2d 
350 (1957), a case decided one year after Sprague, the Utah Supreme 
Court ruled that it was reversible error to admit three (3) 
summaries because some of the figures upon said summaries were not 
supported by competent evidence. 
Subsequently, in the case of Shupe v. Menlove, 18 U 2d 
130, 417 P2d 246 (1966), the appellant contended that it was error 
for the trial Court to exclude such a written summary of charges. 
This Court ruled that the exclusion was not error, commenting 
that rejection of such a summary was within the discretion of the 
trial Court where the appellant was suing upon a construction 
contract upon a house for costs plus 10% ruling that admission of 
such a summary was not a matter of right. 
A more recent case involving the same type of testimony 
\vas Gull Laboratories v. Louis A. Roser Company, No. 15721 filed 
December 27, 1978, in the Utah Supreme Court, wherein the president 
-ll-
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of the plaintiff company testified as to a summary of damages 
totalling $65,197.00 that he prepared the summary from the books 
and records of his company. Over objection by defense counsel 
that it was not the best evidence, the trial Court admitted the 
summary. This ruling was held to be reversible error on appeal. 
This Court cited the Sprague case supra and commented that no 
foundation was laid as to the cumbersomeness or unavailability 
of the records, nor was there any testimony as to how the orig-
inal records were made, ie., accounting procedures or regularity 
of making entries. The Court also noted that there was a refusal 
to produce the original records. 
The proper rule is stated in B. Jones, Evidence (Sth 
Ed. 1958) p. 473. 
§244--Summaries of Multiple Writings.--
Another exception to the best evidence rule, 
based on necessity, arises whe.n the primary source of 
oroof consists of numerous documents which cannot be 
conveniently examined in Court, and the fact to be 
proved can only be ascertained by an examination of 
the whole collection. It is well established that in 
such a case a summary * * * 
may be given in evidence by any person who has ex-
amined the documents and who is skilled in such matters. 
provided the result is capable of being ascertained by 
calculation.* ·k * 
Rule 63 (13) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides t~i 
followingexception to the hearsay rule: 
"
1
-Jritings offered as memoranda or records of 
acts, conditions or events to prove the facts stated 
therein, if the judge finds that thev were made in t~ 
-12-
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regular course of business at or about the time of tb! 
acti condition or event recorded, and that the sourcee 
of nformatlon from which made and the method and 
circumstance of their preparation were such as to in-
dicate their trustworthiness." 
The dealership of Pioneer was closed out in the three 
(3) weeks following August 6, 1975. Presumably, the books and 
records of the plaintiff should reflect such a closeout and the 
various charges which make up the balance sought; yet Exhibit "26" 
which is a statement prepared by plaintiff on the open account 
dated April 20, 1977, almost eight (8) months afterwards, shows a 
balance of $14,714.35, only 67% of the balance which the plaintiff 
ultimately contended was due upon the open account. Such books or 
records cannot be said to be made at or about the time of the act, 
condition or event recorded. 
As a part of the alleged amount due upon the open account, 
there was a charge for $10,304.60 to the open account,(Exhibit 12, 
top of 2nd page) which was claimed by International Harvester as a 
"3% penalty" (Exhibit 27 shows one such charge) which was assessed 
upon an alleged amount of $306,000.00 worth of equipment that the 
plaintiff allegedly took back into its possession. (R. 269-270). 
None of the credit invoices representing the various pieces of 
machinery handled in this way were in the possession of the witness 
Critchfield nor did he produce them for counsel for plaintiff. 
(R. 281-282). 
International Harvester Company and the plaintiff are 
· (R 221 L l) Mr. Homestead, an employee separate corporat~ons. . . . 
of the plaintiff never testified about how the charges originated, 
\vhat the books original entries were, or who kept them or in what 
manner they were kept on behalf of the plaintiff. Nor did he 
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teatify as to how any of these matters were accomplished on the 
part of International Harvester Company; nor did he testify as to 
what charges originated with the plaintiff and what charges were 
originated through International Harvester, also there was no 
competent evidence that the open account charges of International 
Harvester Company were in fact assigned to plaintiff. 
The trial Court never made any finding as to the books ; 
and records of International Harvester or the plaintiff and the 
way they were kept, but if such a finding were made, it could not 
be that the entries were made at or about the time of the act, 
condition or event recorded as required by Rule 63 (13) URE cited 
above. If such a finding were made, it would be directly opposite 
to the requirement of Rule 63 (13) URE. Such a rule has been 
the law of evidence in this state for sixty-five years. In the 
case of Utah Commercial Savings Bank v. Fox, 44 U 323, 140 P 660 
(1914), this Court in reversing a judgment and remanding made the 
following comment regarding certain book entries which were admit· 
ted by the trial Court to show the purpose of a note: 
"Even the entries in the books that were 
produced have little, if any, probative force, 
since in most instances they were made neither 
by the person who knew the actual facts recorded, 
nor were the entries made at the time the trans-
actions occurred, but were made a long time after 
the transactions had taken place. Nor are the 
book entries such as clearly explain themselves, 
so that one may say they can be implicitly relied 
on as tending to establish a particular fact or 
facts. Indeed, under the ordinary rules of 
evidence, those entries would practically be of 
no probative force or effect whatever." 
The plaintiff in the subject case did not produce a 
summary of the items which made up the total balance, which takes 
this case even one step beyond the Sprague, Shupe, Nalder or Gu£ 
-14-
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cases, supra. Such a ruling totally destroys the hornbook 
rule of law that requires a plaintiff to prove its case by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. Also, such a rule virtually leaves 
a dealer or customer at the mercy of the billing de~artment 
of the seller where the seller bills the customer for various 
items, some of them erroneous, and the customer protests the 
erroneous items and the billing department has the written records 
showing the manner in which orders for the erroneous items were 
originated. In a suit between the seller and the buyer, before 
the seller can be given a judgment it should be the seller's 
burden to show whether or not orders for the items were in fact 
made, and if so, whether there was an agreed upon price or 
whether the price was reasonable. 
The total inappropriateness of the application of a 
rule of evidence which allows evidence three (3) or four (4) 
times removed from the actual source to be admitted is easily seen 
when it is considered that $1,914.07 or almost 10% of the account 
balance sued upon was conceded by the plaintiff as being errone-
ous only on the day of the trial and further, when the errors 
which consistently cropped up, are considered, the trustworthiness 
of the books of the plaintiff is seen to be very poor. 
a. Pioneer ordered $300.00 to $400.00 worth of nuts 
and bolts resulting in over $5,000.00 worth of nuts and bolts being 
shipped and Pioneer's account was charged with those items. It 
took numerous demands and seven months for IHCC to remove this 
charge from the account. (R. 304). 
b. IHCC charged defendant's open account with 
$6,000.00 worth of tools which were to go on a note, it took 
-15-
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numerous demands and several months to remove this charge from 
the account. (R. 304). 
c. International Harvester Company shipped to 
Pioneer $4,000.00 worth of obsolete parts which Pioneer did not 
order and which did not fit any machinery which Pioneer had in 
stock. These parts were still in the inventory at the close out 
of the dealership. Pioneer only received $2,000.00 credit for 
them. (R.401-403). 
d. International Harvester Company shipped to 
Pioneer seven (7) boxes of service binders not ordered, Pioneer 
never received credit for these binders. (R. 386). 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING ORAL 
EVIDENCE THAT PIONEER OWED THE 
PLAINTIFF $4,311.81 ON NOTES 
Plaintiff's witness, Homestead testified over the ob-
jection of defense counsel as to no foundation, hearsay and not 
the best evidence that defendants owed plaintiff the sum of 
$4,311.81 upon wholesale notes. (R. 211-213). The notes were 
never admitted into evidence, never produced for examination of 
counsel and the execution thereof was denied by defendants. 
The general rule is found at Bills and Notes, 12 Am Jur 
2nd p. 333 § 1299: 
"As a general rule, at least, there can be no 
recovery on an alleged bill or note which is not 
introduced in evidence if its absence is not ex-
plained as a foundation for proof of its contents 
See also 11 CJS Bills & ~otes § 682 
In searching the Utah cases on this point, there are 
cases which hold that where the pro!!lissor admits execution of 
the notes, that it is not necessarv to oroduce the original docc· 
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ment, Albergo v. Gigliotti, 96 U 170, 85 P2d 107 (1938). 
ever, where there is an issue as to the execution and existance 
of the note, it is a proper rule that the original be produced 
and marked "reduced to judgment." Utah Commercial Savings Bank 
v. Fox, 44 U 323, 140 P 660 (1914). In this matter, the amended 
complaint did not alleg! the execution and delivery of the notes, 
but merely alleged a balance due which was denied in the answer 
of defendants and again in the opening statement of defendants 
counsel, again in a motion to dismiss and again in a Rule 59 
motion. The testimony of plaintiff's witness was admitted over 
the objection of defense counsel, which was error. The sum of 
$4,311.85 was used to arrive at the amount of the judgment and 
this sum should be deducted therefrom. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CHARGED THE DEFENDA.'IT 
WITH RETAIL CONTRACT LOSSES CONTRARY 
TO THE PROVISIONS OF A CONTRACT WHICH 
WAS DRAFTED BY THE PLAINTIFF 
Exhibit "2" was described by Del Homestead at (R. 178 
L. 2) as being a document that sets up the financing arrangements 
between International Harvester Credit Corporation and Pioneer 
Tractor and Implement for retail financing of agricultural equip-
ment. This document is on a printed form bearing the logo of 
plaintiff in the upper right hand corner. 
Exhibit "E" attached to Exhibit "2" provided as follows: 
"R. DEALER AGREES AS TO EACH RETAIL CONTRACT ACCEPTED 
BY IHCC: 
l. That the down oayment and terms of sale shall be 
in compliance with IHCC's authorized terms in effect at 
the time such Retail Contract is submitted for acceptance 
by IHCC. 
2. That he warrants that: 
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(a) The Retail Contract will be valid and free 
from defenses, offsets, or counterclaims; 
(b) the Retail Contract will constitute a first 
lien in favor of IHCC upon the goods for which it 
will have been given, and it will have been filed 
or recorded according to law to preserve the prior-
ity of such lien; 
(c) all statements contained therein and in the 
purchaser's statement will be true and complete; 
(d) ~o part of the down payment or of any in-
stallment will have been advanced, directly or 
indirectly, by him to the user; 
(e) on the date of the assignment or endorsement 
to IHCC the goods will have been delivered; and 
(f) the transaction represented by the Retail 
Contract was an actual bona fide sale in the usual 
course of business. 
3. Upon request by IHCC, to purchase from it for cash 
for the unpaid balance thereof, plus IHCC's expenses, less 
unearned finance charges, and less credits to the Dealer's 
reserve account, provided for in Section A-2 (a) hereof, 
any Retail Contract if he has breached any warranty or 
agreement with respect thereto contained in this Arrange-
ment. No formal tender of any Retail Contract for purchase 
by Dealer shall be required. 
4. Upon the request of IHCC to render, without charge, 
assistance in its collection or in repossession of goods 
covered by Retail Contracts, and upon repossession, to 
store and care for such goods, subject to IHCC's order, 
all without cost to IHCC. Also, upon request of IHCC, 
and upon being furnished by IHCC with such replacement 
parts as may be necessary, to recondition the repossessed 
goods. In such cases, Dealer's established customer rates 
for labor shall be paid by IHCC. 
5. That he hereby waives presentment, protest, and all 
demands or notice as to each Retail Contract, and consents 
to anv extensions of time or compromise with any persons 
without affecting his liability. (em~hasis added) 
6. That he hereby authorizes IHCC, at its option, to 
pay to IH to be apulied to his obligations, all or any par: 
of any amounts which he might otherwise be entitled to re-
ceive in cash from IHCC under this Arrangement .... 
and at paragraph 8 thereof: 
8. As security for, and not in lieu of, performance b:· 
Dealer of all obligations of this arrangement, to the 
establishment of a suecial reserve account in Dealer's 
name, herein referred to as "Dealer's Reserve Account." 
(a) such dealer's reserve account:. 
(iv) Subject to the reservation of 8(c) belo•.,• 
shall be debited ~ith all losses, including out of-
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It was undisputed that the reserve account of the dealer, 
Pioneer had a credit balance of $5,000.00 (R. 511 and Exhibit "12") 
as of December 31, 1976 and that the pur?ose of the reserve account 
is to protect the dealer from astronomical losses and also to 
protect International Harvester Credit Corporation. (R. 183). 
The following char~es were for losses allegedly sustained by 
the plaintiff as a result of retail contracts upon new agricultural 
equipment. 
a. Myron Jones: In Hay of 1976, Pioneer sold a tractor 
upon a retail contract and it was financed by the plaintiff upon 
a retail contract (R. 188) as a result of this the plaintiff charged 
52,800.00 to the ooen account which was objected to on grounds of 
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foundation. (R. 188). An interest charge of $1,006.00 was also 
made to the open account upon this aame transaction. 
b. Duane Taylor: The plaintiff charged defendants 
account with $2,832.46 because the customer contended that he 
owed something different than the sum stated in the retail 
contract and the retail contract was not in evidence. (R. 195). 
c. A charge of $1,278.35 on a retail contract of 
William Branch was made to the finance reserve account of Pioneer 
which, if properly proved would have been proper. However, the 
plaintiff is inconsistent in the treatment of this loss on a 
retail contract. All losses upon retail contracts should have 
been so treated. 
d. A charge of $599.03 for a hitch upon a drill for 
retail customer, Garth Sweeten which the defendant contended 
was ordered with the drills from International Harvester and not 
delivered. (R. 343). The plaintiff claimed that it had to furn-
ish such a hitch. 
e. A charge of $431.63 based upon a contention of 
retail customer Sam Kogianes that his combine should have had a 
different attachment upon his combine than his agreement provided 
The foregoing losses, exclusive of the Branch contract, 
~vhich was charged to the reserve account rather than the open 
account,amount to $7,669.12, and were included in the findings 
of fact and the judgment amount. 
Nowhere in Exhibits "1" or "2" is there an attempt at the 
definition of what Hould be termed a "loss" under a retail con-
tract, but the use of the terms "all losses" sustained by IHCC 
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on any retail contract in paragraph 8(a) (iv) would certainly 
indicate to any person reading it that the company (IHCC), 
when it used that term meant it to mean just that - all 
losses. However, when the company applied the agreement to the 
facts here, it refused to apply paragraph 8, according to its 
terms, and charged all losses on retail contacts of equipment 
to the open account. When questioned about this at pages 
237-239, plaintiff's witness Homestead indicated that the company 
only charged the reserve account when there was a repossession, 
preferring to hold the dealer's reserve account without interest 
and charge the dealer's open account with such losses, as 
claiming that such non-repossession losses came under the pro-
visions of paragraph B instead. Paragraph 8 does not use the 
term "only repossession losses" or even use the term "repossessi.cn'~ 
or make any distinction or modification of what it means by the 
term "all losses." 
Assuming for the purpose of argument that some breach of the 
provisions of paragraph B (2) was proved by competent evidence 
in the Court below, it is apparent that there is a conflict be-
tween the provision of paragraph B (3) (5) and paragraph C (8). 
However, viewed in their proper perspective, it is apparent that 
the provisions of paragraph C 8 (b) and (c) were intended to 
'protect the dealer from astronomical losses" upon retail contracts. 
See Homestead's testimony at (R. 183). 
It was plaintiff's contention at trial that the following 
•.vords in Exhibit 2 E allowed plaintiff to make compromises with 
retail customers and charge them to the dealer's account: 
"B. Dealer agrees as to each Retail Contract accepted by 
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IHCC: 
5. That he hereby waives presentment, protest, and 
all demands or notice as to each Retail Contract, and 
consents to any extension of time or comoromise with any 
persons, without affecting his liability." 
The sole word out of all of the exhibits that purportedly 
gives the plaintiff authority to charge Pioneer's account with 
the above retail losses is the word "compromise." None of the 
documents specify just what item or items the dealer purportedly 
consents in advance to "compromise" or in what manner such com-
promise is to be accomplished. The word "compromise" is used 
in the agreement in the same phrase as consenting to extensions 
of time and therefore, could be construed as consenting to 
compromise as to the time an obligation is to be paid. Also, 
the word compromise is followed by "without affecting his lia-
bility." Does this mean that the dealer only consents to a 
compromise without affecting the dealers liability? If so, then 
it could be inferred that the dealer's liability could not be in-
creased by the compromise; as to do so would certainly "affect" 
the dealer's liability. It is submitted that such a brief phrase 
having so many possible interpretations could not and should not 
be construed to cost a dealer several thousand dollars at the 
whim of the holder thereof. 
In any event, to use such a phrase to charge losses upon 
retail contracts to the dealers open account is contrary to the 
plain intent of the language in paragraPh 8(a) (iv), 8(b) and 
8(c), cited above and is a direct contradiction to the well re-
cognized rule of law in this and other jurisdictions that docu-
ments drafted by a party will be strictly construed againstthat 
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party. Guinand v. Walton, 22 U 2d 196, 450 
at 25 U 2d 253, 480 P2d 137 (1971), Seal v. Tayco, 16 U 2d 323, 
400 P2d 503 (1963), Christopher v. Larson Ford, 557 P2d 1009, 
(1976)' ) Skousen v. Smith, 27 U 2nd 169, 493 P2d 1003 
(1972). Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, ___ u 2d __ _ 559 P2d 
538 (1977). The Seal case is particularly applicable to the 
instant case. A distributor of brake shoes sued a dealer and the 
dealer counterclaimed, based upon delay by the distributor. The 
distributor claimed that the words "In no event shall seller be 
liable for special or consequential damages," which comprised 
the last sentence in a paragraph, gave the distributor a blanket 
protection against any claim, while the dealer claimed that such 
language was limited to the causes which immediately preceded 
this sentence. 
This Court ruled for the dealer, commenting: 
" ... it seems manifestly unfair to permit one who 
formulates a contract to so fashion it as to mislead 
the other party by setting forth a clearly apparent 
promise or representation in order to induce accept-
ance, and then designedly "burying" elsewhere in the 
document, in fine print, provisions which purport to 
limit or take away the promise, and/or preclude re-
covery for failure to fulfill it." 
The testimony of Wayne Schoenfeld was that Homestead told 
him that the losses on retail contracts would be limited to 
$1,000.00 charged to the reserve account, (R. 399-401), but 
such oral testimony was stricken by the Court. 
In the instant case, as in Seal, a party should not have 
the benefit of drafting an instrument with conflicting provisions 
in it make representations as to its benefits and then have it 
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construed in such a way as to maximize his benefits in the event 
of a dispute, thus the charges of $7,669.12 should be deducted 
from the open account and charged to the dealer's reserve 
account in accordance with the terms of plaintiff's own agreenent. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING 
EVIDENCE OF MONEY TRANSACTIONS 
BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND INTERNATIONAL 
HARVESTER COMPANY TO SUPPORT A 3% 
~~DLI~G CHARGE, WHICH WAS IN FACT 
A PENALTY 
The Court received testimony from Noel Critchfield as to 
a purported telephone bill of $450 (R. 288), a charge of $13,800.00 
as interest charged by the olaintiff to International Harvester 
for inventory returned from Pioneer (R. 272) and $2,300.00 as 
a service charge (R. 274) over the objections of defense counsel 
as bein~ without foundation and not the best evidence. These 
items were presented to the Court for the purpose of showing 
that a 3% handling charge was not a penalty and bore no relation-
ship to the out-of-pocket expenses incurred by International 
Harvester Company in the close-out of the dealership. 
Other than the telephone bill, the witness was not asked 
if he had personal knowledge of any of the charges to which he 
testified. No business records or other documents were offered 
or admitted to show any of said charges, nor was there any evid-
ence oral or writte~ that a cause of action for any of said 
amounts was assigned to olaintiff. 
In answers to interro~atories, as to the question of out-
of-pocket costs incurred, the plaintiff at (R. 75-92) onlv 
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specified the figure of $3,147.81 with $670.00 of that 
being an estimate only. As to International Harvester 
employees, there was an expenditure of approximately $2,000.00 
in out-of-oocket expenses including an amount which was est-
imated (R. 287-288). An objections was made to the amount 
which was estimated on the basis of no foundation (R. 288). 
As to the charges between International Harvester Company and 
the plaintiff, the witness Critchfield admitted that he didn't 
have the documents suoporting their transactions and said docu-
ments had never been made available to counsel for plaintiff 
(R. 281-283). At finding; of fact No. 7 (R. 23), such evidence 
was referred to in the finding of the Court that "evidence was 
Dresented showing substantial costs to International Harvester' 
as a result of repurchase of the equi~ment. Such evidence, 
other than the evidence and documents produced at (R. 75-92) 
should have been excluded on the basis of best evidence, hearsay 
and no foundation in accordance with defendant's objections and 
motion to strike at the end of ?laintiff's case. (R. 288). 
Plaintiff's witness Homestead testified that of the ryer-
sons who were listed upon the supplemental answers to interrog-
atories, the following employees were employed by International 
Harvester Company. (R. 235-236): 
N.R. Critchfield 
H. Enright 
F.L. Jacobsen 
R.D. Coffman 
-25-
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The salaries of these employees were incurred by 
International Harvester Company regardless of whether they 
participated in the close-out of Pioneer. (R. 236). The total 
charges incurred by International Harvester Company actually 
proved by any competent evidence was the sum of $1,313.57 in 
out-of-pocket costs. The remainder of any alleged expenses 
should have been excluded upon the basis of no foundation and 
hearsay for the same reasons and under the same cases as cited 
in subsection I above. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE 3% PENALTY CHARGE BORE A REASONABLE 
RELATIONSHIP TO THE COSTS AND EXPENSES 
ACTUALLY INCURRED 13Y INTERNATIONAL 
HARVESTER COMPANY 
The 37. handling charge referred to as a penalty on invoices 
of International Harvester Company is referred to at paragraph 
29 of Exhibit "1", the parties to which are International Harvester 
Corporation in closing out the dealership are shown in the supp-
lemental answers to interrogatories and as testified to by Del 
Homestead are shown as the expenses of Noel Critchfield - $784.33, 
W. Enwright- $193.51, F.L. Jacobson- $208.57, and R.D. Coffm~ 
- $137.16, which totals $1,323.57. Otherwise, the freight and 
handling of the equipment was accomplished by Pioneer Tractor or 
other dealers. Hhile Mr. Homestead testified to other expenses, 
these were expenses of International Harvester Credit Company, 
not International Harvester Company, the Darty to the contract. 
The plaintiff cannot claim these expenses because they were not 
parties to the contract, nor have they been competently oroven. 
"Section 70A-2-718 U.C.A. Drovides in oart that 
the oarties may agree to a· liquidated damage 
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clause in the event of breach, but only in an 
am01.mt which is reasonable in the light of the 
anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach." 
It is submitted that $1,323.57 does not bear a reason-
able relationship to the sum of $10,364.30, even if said figure 
was competently proved. The sum of $10,364.30 is almost eight 
(8) times the actual expenses incurred by International 
Harvester Corporation as a result of the termination of the deal-
ership. Such a windfall has been uniformly held to be a penalty 
and not enforceable. See Berkins v. Spencer, 112 U 468, 243 
P2d 446 (1952). Such a policy has been aryplied to sales of 
merchandise, Western Macaroni v. Fiore, 47 U 108, 151 P 984 (1915). 
Also see Restatements of Contracts § 339. 
The Western Macaroni case contained the following rule: 
"When the question of whether a contract provides a 
penalty or liquidated damages is in doubt, the contract 
ordinarily will be regarded as providing a penalty. If 
the stipulation is a penalty, it, as such, will not be 
enforced, but simply the actual amount of dama~es sus-
tained if less that the amount of the penalty.' 
In the Hestern Macaroni case, the Court upheld a lower 
Court ruling that a $500.00 liquidated damae;e amount was a pen-
alty where the actual damages suffered was $80.00, a case in 
which the liquidated amount was about six (6) times the damages 
actually incurred. 
The Western Macaroni case was cited favorably in the 
Perkins case suura and has not been overturned or modified by any 
decision since that time. (See discussion of cases in Perkins). 
Since the Perkins case, this Court decided the case of Johnson v. 
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Carman, U __ , 572 P2d 371 (1977) where this language was 
used in upholding a trial Court decision: 
"Althoughwe do not purport to lay down any specific 
percentage which will be considered unconscionable, to 
allow seller to retain the $34,596.10 paid by buyer when 
seller's actual damages amount to only $25,650.00 would 
be "grossly excessive and disproportionate to any loss." 
Such would be to allow seller to retain payments totalling 
some 34% greater than the actual damages determined by the 
trial Court." 
The situation as to the actual damages the plaintiff or 
its assignor may or may not have sustained in reselling said 
equipment is rather obscure, as the defendants requested the re-
sale price of the equipment in interrogatories, which information 
was never provided by the plaintiff. (Seep. 165). When plain-
tiff's witness Homestead was asked why such information was never 
provided, the witness said: 
"No, it has not, because the equipment was taken 
back in accordance with the sales and service 
agreement." (R. 241) 
~fuen asked what steps he had taken to verify where the 
information was, the witness replied at (R. 242 L. 2): 
"I have not taken it upon myself to contact the 
Kansas City office to try and institute a search 
for these records unless it's absolutely necessary 
because of the costs involved." 
It is apparent from the foregoing that the plaintiff does 
not deem its loss in this re~ard significant enough to search 
out the records necessary to prove its case. Perhaps the reason 
is that the plaintiff did not incur the loss. 
It is submitted that under all of the facts and circum-
stances, that plaintiff should not be allowed to reap a windfall 
of approximately $9,000.00 at the expense of defendants. 
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POINT VI 
IT l\IAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO REFUSE 
TO ALLOW AN AMENDMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 
15(b) URCP TO SHOW SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT 
THAT NO LIABILITY BEYOND THE APPLICATION 
OF ASSETS OF PIONEER TO THE DEBT TO IHCC 
WOULD BE CHARGED 
Exhibit No. 25 is a two (2) part document, the first 
page of which is a paper in the handwiring of Wayne Schoea£e14 
ca?tioned: 
"WE Ol\IE TO HARVESTER" 
Lawn Mower --------------------$ 
Combine -----------------------
200.00 
22,381.00 
363.95 
17,500.00 
3,800.0-
Mbnater (sic) -----------------Stei~er -----------------------
Check -------------------------
Freight --------------$21,881.11 
Pure. Lawn Equip.----- 1,000.00 
Warranty AG ---------- 4,165.66 
~.Jarranty Truck ------- 1,208.80 
Parts ---------------- 6,000.00 
Equipment ------------ 25,500.00 
$59,755.57 
$ 44,044.95 
TRADES 
TD 9 Cat --------$ 4500.00 
D 6 Cat --------- 9000.00 
Red Truck ------- 6500.00 
Drills (2) ------ 3000.00 
2 Used tiC Drill - 1000.00 
A tractor ------- · 900.00 
H tractor ------- 600.00 _ __;~;....:..::..;:.
$25,500.00" 
The second page is a security agreement ~repared by Del 
Homestead on behalf of International Harvester Credit which pro-
vides as follows: 
"For good and valuable consideration, the receipt 
of which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned Pioneer 
Tractor and Implement Inc., (X) Corporation located or 
residing at Spanish Fork, Utah (hereinafter called Debtor), 
for the purpose of additionally securing payment of a 
certain contract(s), note(s), security agreement(s) or 
account(s) (hereinafter individually and collectively 
called contract) entered into by and between the debtor 
and International Harvester Cornoany dated , 19 , 
and on which Debtor is presently indebted to InternatfOnal 
Harvester Credit Corn. (hereinafter called Secured Party), 
as seller or seller's assignee, in the total amount of 
$44,322.00, payable in installments as follows: ... " 
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Homestead took possession oD the original of Exhibit No. 
25. 
Mr. Don Sterret, general sales manager of Pioneer testi-
fied that he, Schoenfeld and Critchfield had a meeting and he 
and Schoenfeld were told what to eX?ect in the close-out of the 
dealership a day or two after the resignation of Pioneer. The 
assets and what was owed would pretty much handle themselves 
and Homestead and Critchfield concurred. 
Mr. Noel Critchfield testified that he and Del Homestead, 
prior to the meeting with Schoenfeld had discussed the figures 
contained on Exhibit No. 25 and had agreed to those figures. 
(R. 549-551). 
Mr. Pugsley at p. 550 asked the following question: 
"With respect to Exhibit 25 which has been shown to 
you, did you ever agree to those figures in the meeting that has 
been referred to? 
I believe Del Wrote these figures up, and when he 
went over them with me I was agreeable with them, yes. 
Do you know that this is Mr. Homestead's writing? 
Not exactly, I don't; but we, Del and I discussed 
these things prior to our meeting with." 
A motion was made by defendants at the close of evidence 
to amend the answer of defendants to conform to the evidence 
that the agents of the plaintiff and International Harvester 
Company had made a novation and waived the 3% handling charge. 
(R. 551). 1.-Jhile the motion was taken under advisement, it appar· 
ently was denied. 
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Rule 15(b) URCP provides as follows: 
11 (b) AMENDMENTS TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE : 
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by 
express or implied consent of the oarties, they shall ba 
treated in all respects as if they.had been raised to 
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these 
issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, 
even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not 
affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evid-
ence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it 
is not to be amended when the presentation of the merits 
of the action will be subserved thereby and the objectina 
party fails to satisfy the Court that the admission of 
such evidence would prejudice him in ma&ntaining his 
action or defense upon the merits. The Court shall grant 
a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party 
to meet such evidence. 11 
When an issue as to a second agreement has been tried with 
the implied consent of the parties, it is error for the trial 
Court not to grant a motion made pursuant to Rule 15(b) URCP. 
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 U 2nd 205, 381 P2d 86 (1963). Parties to 
a written agreement may, by their subsequent action modify such 
agreements notwithstanding provisions to the contrary in the 
first agreement. Dillman v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 13 U 2d 142, 
(1962) 369 P2d 296, Calhoun v. Universal Credit, 106 U 166, 146 
P2d 284 (1944), Davis v. Payne, 10 U 2d 53, 348 P2d 337. 
The motion by defendant to amend should have been granted, 
and the Court should have found that the parties by their actions 
formed a new agreement and waived the 3% handling charge. 
POINT VII 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING INTEREST IN 
THE SUM OF $5,291.09. 
Plaintiff's witness Homestead testified over the objection 
of defendant's counsel that his calculations showed that the 
~laintiff was entitled to the sum of $5,219.09 as interest. 
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was upon the total amount of $25,098.36, which was comprised 
of $4,311.81 upon wholesale notes and $19,780.19 upon the open 
account. There was no testimony as to when the interest began to 
accrue or what rate was used in this computation, other than 
that it was based upon the prime rate of three (3) New York 
banks which were never named by the witness. 
Exhibit "1" provides at page 7 first paragraph "Such 
notes or contracts shall mature according to the terms in effect 
at the time of delivery and draw interest at the rate established 
by the Company and specified therein. The word "therein" refers 
to the notes or contracts. No notes or contracts other than 
Exhibit "2" were entered into evidence. There is a Schedule of 
terms stlapled to the back cover of Exhibit "1", after the signa-
ture of Pioneer, which schedule bears only one staple, while 
Exhibit "l" to which said schedule is attached bears two staple 
holes which go from the front cover through the back cover, but 
doesnot go through the schedule attached inside the back cover, 
showing that the schedule was not always attached to Exhibit "1". 
This schedule at page 4 has a clause which provides that 
interest owed on floor plan obligations will be due monthly and 
determined at 3-l/2% over the prime rate after maturity and 
1-l/2% over prime rate before maturity. There is no mention in 
this exhibit of the interest rate to be charged upon retail con-
tracts or upon the open account. It is impossible to tell from 
the evidence r.;hat if any part of the sums claimed bv the plaintii' 
were floor plan obligations, and which items were not floor plan 
obligations. In any event, the latter clause is in conflict ·.vir'· 
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the first provision at page 7, first paragraph of Exhibit "1" 
which is a printed form, bearing the logo of International 
Harvester Company and was drawn by plaintiff's alleged assignor. 
In the event of a conflict or vagueness in terms of such a docu-
ment, the document should be construed against the drawer. 
See the Guinand, Seal and Bank of Ephriam cases ~· 
There were no notes or contracts i~ evidence from which 
a rate can be established pursuant to the first paragraph of page 
7 of Exhibit "1". Without a written document providing for a 
different rate of interest signed by the party to be charged. 
The only rate of interest which would be applicable would 
be the statutory rate of 6% as provided in 15-1-1 (U.C.A. 1953 
as amended). Which section provides as folLows: 
"Legal Rate-The legal rate of interest for the 
loan or forebearance of any money, ~oods or thin~s in 
action shall be six per cent per annum. But nothing 
herein contained shall be so construed as to in any 
way affect any penalty or interest charge which by law 
applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any contract 
or obligations made before the 14th day of May, 1907." 
Are the charges upon which plaintiff is suing a loan or 
forebearance of any money, goods or thi111;s in action? 
In particular, a purported charge for $10,304.30 made 
in the close-out of the dealership upon defendants' open account, 
\vas based upon 3% of an alleged amount of inventory that was 
returned to International Harvester at the expense of Pioneer. 
There was no evidence to TJrove this charge Presented to the 
Court. There was no evidence that as a result of said charge, 
the defendant Pioneer received any "loan or forebearance of any 
monev, goods or things in action." There are no cases in Utah 
which interoret this part of the foregoing statute. It is 
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submitted however, that it was not the intent of the drafter 
of such a statute to charge a 6% per annum charge in addition 
to a 3% charge upon an amount that is unverifiable until 
judgment. 
This Court has consistently held, however, that in order 
to assess interest, the time of the loss or damage must be as-
certained and the interest capable of being mathematically 
computed from the evidence. Fell v. Union Pacific Corporation, 
32 U 101, 88 P 1003 (1907); Uinta Pipeline Corporation v. White 
Superior Co. , u 2d , 546 P2d 885 (1976); Anderson v. 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., ____ __ U2d , 583 P2d 101 (1978). 
Nowhere in the evidence did the plaintiff establish the 
date or dates upon which the various and sundry charges they 
claim came into being. Without such information, a total amount 
of interest cannot be calculated. The sum of $5,291.09 as 
interest should be deducted from the findings. 
POINT VIII 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
DENY THE DEFENDANTS A TRIAL BY JURY 
can 
This Court, in reviewing the recordi make mathematical 
deductions from the findings of fact and conclusions of law as 
(see the Seal case, supra) 
it deems properf If this is truly a case in equity, as the pla~· 
tiff insisted in a motion to strike the jury demand, then this 
Court has the prerogative and the right to weigh the evidence 
and decide questions of fact relating thereto. See Christopher 
v. Larson Ford (supra). On the other hand, if in fact this is a 
case at law, then the defendants have a right to have the issues 
decided by a jurv. See Vallev !-1ortuar' v. Fairbanks, 119 U 20~ 
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225 P2d 739 (1950). This action was not a foreclosure of a 
mortgage or for other equitable relief, but a suit upon notes 
and an account and a guaranty with issues having equitable 
aspects in which there were underlying factual issues upon which 
a jury could have acted in an advisory capacity both on the main 
case and the third party complaint. If this court does remand 
this case for a new trial, then a direction should be made to 
try the case before a jury. 
CO~lCLUSION 
In conclusion, the findings and judgment of the trial 
Court are based upon testimony that was not the best evidence, 
hearsay evidence and information having no foundation. It was 
error for the trial Court to deny defendant's motion to dismiss, 
motion to amend the findings and judgment or in the alternative 
for a new trial. This Court should either remand this case 
with instructions to make findings in accordance with the 
actual, competent evidence adduced at the trial, or to remand 
this case for a new trial upon all issues in the claim and third 
party claim by a jury. 
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of April, 1979. 
t:~- _/ !;/ .. / 
'-=',r ,_ ..- ;?. -, I 
~John L. McCoy ~~ 
Attorney for Defendants-A ellants 
10 W. Broadway Building, #430 
Salt Lake City, Utah B4101 
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soing Brief to Philip Pugsley, attorney for pla~nt~ff-respon~ent, 
at 310 South Main Street, Salt Lake CitY,Utal), p~s~age prepa~d. 
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